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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- EMINENT DOMAIN- MASTER FLIGHT PLAN AS A

AREA TO MUNICIPAL AIRPORT-Plaintiff owned land adjacent to the Greater Pittsburgh Airport which lay
under an approach area for one of the runways. Allegheny County, in
compliance with rules and regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Authority,
drafted a "Master Plan," approved by the CAA, which showed the approach
area over part of plaintiff's property. Plaintiff sued to recover damages
from the county, owner and operator of the airport, alleging an appropriation of his land because of the substantial interference with its
use and enjoyment caused by flights at low altitudes above his land
during landings and take-offs. Upon an award of damages by the viewers,
the county objected, claiming there had been no taking; but the lower
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court dismissed the county's exceptions. On appeal from the order of
dismissal, held, reversed, two justices dissenting. Neither the ownership
and operation of the airport nor the adoption of the "Master Plan" constituted a taking by the county of an easement of avigation over plaintiffs
property for which compensation must be made. 1 Griggs v. Allegheny
County, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961).
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"private property" shall not "be taken for public use without just compensation." The Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth amendment
makes this restriction applicable to state govemments. 2 From the words of
the amendment it is clear that there must be a "taking" before a landowner is entitled to compensation. The general rule is that there need
not be an actual physical taking, but that a restriction, diminution, or
interruption of the rights of ownership lessening the value of land, and
conferring property rights upon the public for public use constitutes
a "taking."3
The eminent domain provision of the Constitution has increasing significance in the air age.4 The Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, declares, "There ... exist[s] in behalf
of any citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of transit in
air commerce through the navigable airspace of the United States.''5 "Navigable airspace" is defined as the airspace above the prescribed minimum
altitudes of Hight. Under this definition, the Supreme Court in United
1 There is either an alternative holding or strong dictum declaring that no evidence
was offered to show that such action deprived the plaintiff of the use and enjoyment
of his property, substantially or otherwise. Principal case at 418, 168 A.2d at 126-27.
2 Chicago, B. &: Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
3 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. General Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) ; Portsmouth Harbor Land &: Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917): Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872);
In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P.2d 878 (1934); Nalon v. Sioux City, 216 Iowa 1041,
250 N.W. 166 (1933); Kentucky State Park Comm'n v. Wilder, 260 Ky. 190, 84 S.W.2d
38 (1935) ; Friendship Cemetery v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 200 Md. 430,
90 A.2d 695 (1952); Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893); City of Denton v.
Hunt, 235 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of
Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221, 225-31 (1931); Note, 16 U. DET. L.J. 46 (1952).
When governmental action actually destroys property rights, it may constitute a
regulation-an exercise of the police power, for which compensation is not required.
Sec Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra; Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d
400, 403-07, 348 P.2d 664, 668-69 (1960). For articles discussing the distinction between
regulation and taking, see Abels, Price Control in War and Emergency, 90 U. PA. L. REv.
675 (1942) ; Cochran, Governmental Seizure of a Business To Prevent Strike-Caused
Work Stoppages-Regulation or Taking? 19 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 184 (1950); Kauper,
Wanted: .11 New Definition of the Rate Base, 37 MICH. L. REv. 1209 (1939).
-4 See generally Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma,
56 MICH. L. REv. 1313 (1958) •
5 52 Stat. 973, 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1958).
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States v. Causby 6 held that the navigable airspace which Congress placed in
the public domain did not include the glide path for take-offs and landings. 7 In 1958, however, Congress amended the statute8 and included in
"navigable airspace" the airspace needed to insure safety in take-offs and
landings.9 The court in the principal case, without discussing the effect of
the 1958 statute on the Causby holding, follows categorically the proposition
formulated in that case. The Causby decision places the airports and airlines in a difficult position since a long glide path is necessary for the
operation of large planes.10 The rights of landowners adjacent to airfields
must continually be balanced against the airlines' rights of free access to
the airways. 11 In the balancing process there is no place for the ancient
common law doctrine of usque ad coelum, and in Causby the court clearly
said that it did not apply to modem air transportation.12 The Court in
Causby instead adopted the rule formulated in Hinman v. Pacific Air
Transport 13 that the landowner owns only the airspace he actually occupies,
and can object only to such use of the airspace above the surface as does
actual damage.14 In the principal case the court suggests obiter that
because the flights substantially deprived the plaintiff of the beneficial use
and enjoyment of his property,15 perhaps the airlines would be liable for
a taking if they had been clothed with the power of eminent domain.
In Causby the United States both owned and operated the aircraft which
caused the deprivation of the owner's use and enjoyment of the neighboring property, although the opinion does not indicate who actually maintained and operated the airport. Thus the issue in the principal case
reduced itself to whether ownership of the airport and formulation of a
"Master Plan" alone is sufficient governmental action to constitute a taking
of property which must be compensated under the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court of Washington in Ackerman v. Port of Seattle 16
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Id. at 264.
8 72 Stat. 739, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1958).
9 For a discussion of whether the federal regulatory system has preempted the field
regarding flights in the approach area, see Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst,
238 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1956) .
10 Large airplanes in operation today require a glide path in a ratio of fifty feet in
ground length to each one-foot drop in altitude. See Harvey, supra note 4, at 1314.
11 See generally A Conference on Control and Protection of Airport Approaches, 24
J. Am L. &: CoM. 169 (1957); Rhyne, Airport Legislation and Court Decisions, 14 J. Am
L. &: CoM. 289 (1947) •
12 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). The decision in this case upheld
the claimant's right to damages from the United States for a taking of certain of his
property located near an airport because of a substantial interference with his use
and enjoyment of it by low flights of U.S. military planes when taking off from or
landing at the airport.
13 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937).
14 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261, 262, 264-67 (1946).
15 Principal case at 419, 168 A.2d at 127.
16 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
6
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decided that the Port was liable in damages for a taking which resulted
from low flights into the airport in accordance with federally-prescribed
regulations and orders. This seems to be the only case in which relief was
granted on the grounds of constitutional taking where the defendant
participated in no actual flights.17 In Ackerman, the Port itself did not fly
any planes, and apparently used no "Master Plan,'' yet was held liable for
its failure to provide adequate facilities, necessitating the frequent low
flights over the plaintiff's lands. The court observed that an adequate
approach-way is as necessary a part of an airport as is the ground on which
the airstrip itself is constructed, and must be provided so that private airspace of adjacent landowners will not be invaded by airplanes using the
airport. 18 The Port had the power to acquire arr approach-way by condemnation, but failed to exercise that power, with the result that plaintiff's private airspace was used as an approach area without just compensation having been paid to him. The use of land for the maintainence
of other property devoted to a public purpose is a taking for a public use. 19
Because most of the suits are based either on the nuisance20 or on the
trespass 21 doctrine, there is little authority for the view that property is
"taken" by low flying planes in the approach area. However, the Pennsylvania cases dealing with the filing of a plat as constituting a taking could
have led, by way of analogy, to a finding that use of the "Master Plan"
resulted in a taking. The rule as developed in those cases is that the mere
plotting of a street upon a city plan, without anything more, does not
constitute a taking authorizing compensation to the abutting owners,22
because the marking of a street on a city map indicates nothing more than
an intention to take property in the future. 23 But an exception to the rule
has developed: if the city does some unequivocal act evidencing its intention to open tl1e street followed by actual work done on it, the right to
compensation will accrue even if the council fails or neglects to pass an
opening ordinance.24 In the airport situation it is quite obvious that a
17 But see United States v. 48.10 Acres of Land, 144 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
and United States v. 4.43 Acres of Land, 137 F. Supp. 567, 569 (N.D. Tex. 1956).
18 Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 409-11, 348 P.2d 664, 671-72 (1960).
10 Id. at 410, 348 P.2d at 671.
20 See City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958); Burnham
v. Beverly Ainvays, Inc., 3ll Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942); Smith v. New England
Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 5Il, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
21 See Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942). But see City of
Phoenix v. Harlan, 75 Ariz. 290, 255 P.2d 609 (1953); Brooks v. Patterson, 159 Fla. 263,
31 So. 2d 472 (1947); Crew v. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 58 A.2d 179 (1948).
22 Philadelphia Parkway Opening, 295 Pa. 538, 145 Atl. 600 (1929); Hoffer v.
Reading Co., 287 Pa. 120, 134 Atl. 415 (1926) ; Herrington's Petition, 266 Pa. 88, 109Atl. 791 (1920); Rowan v. Commonwealth, 261 Pa. 88, 104 Atl. 502 (1918) ; Bush v.
McKeesport, 166 Pa. 57, 30 Atl. 1023 (1895); Whitaker v. Phoenixville Borough, 141 Pa.
327, 21 Atl. 604 (1891) ; Volkmar Street, 124 Pa. 320, 16 Atl. 867 (1889); Forbes Street.
70 Pa. 125 (1871) .
23 See Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. 257, 261, 95 Atl. 429 (1915).
24 Philadelphia Appeal, 364 Pa. 71, 70 A.2d 847 (1950) ; Philadelphia Parkway~
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glide-path is necessary for take-offs and landings and that the purpose for
which the airport was constructed cannot be effectuated without such a
path. The condemnation of land and the construction of the airport is
the beginning of the project necessary for flights. It is an unequivocal
indication of the intention of the political subdivision to open an operational unit which requires an approach area. As the court said in Ackerman, the subdivision which is granted the power to condemn should
condemn enough private property for the total functional operation of
the airport.25 If it does not and the planes are allowed to use the airport,
there is clearly an acquiesence by the subdivision in the take-offs and
landings; this constitutes a taking the same as would condemnation, and
the subdivision should be liable for any intederence with the beneficial
use of the property.
It would appear that the reasoning of the Ackerman case is to be
preferred, especially in view of the fact that the Pennsylvania Airport
Zoning Act confers upon political subdivisions the power to condemn
property interests for air avigation easements to provide approach protection for aircraft.26 While this statute is not couched in the words of an
affirmative command to a city or county to condemn all property in the
landing area, it is indicative of a legislative desire that political subdivisions use their authority to condemn property where it is needed for
the proper operation of an airport.
Ralph L. Wright, S.Ed.

supra note 23. See also Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951), where the
court refused to apply the general rule regarding street plans to the drawing of a plan
for the construction of parks or playgrounds. It was held that an ordinance establishing
such a plan without providing for compensation was unconstitutional.
25
26

Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 409, 348 P.2d 664, 671 (1960).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1563 (Supp. 1960).

